The negative selection in public service contracts

Adam Majgier

Abstract

One of two methods of the offers estimation, submitted by the contractors applying for the public procurement , is the price criterion. In that case, all offers should meet the requirements of the customer who chooses the offer with the lowest price. The specificity of services causes the situation where the buyer cannot verify the quality of the service before it will be consumed. Therefore the ordering can choose the offer which will appear as the low-quality service. The reason of that issue is the asymmetry of the information between the ordering and the contractor which differentiates the private information that have the two sides of the contract at their disposal. The purpose of the work was constructing the model which would let to present the reasons of the inappropriateness of the choices based exclusively on the price. Thereby, the research embraced the conduct in the mode of the unlimited public tender on property protection service, which the subject was the detailed analysis of the common information for all participants of the public tender. The public tender documentation was characterized in terms of completeness of the information and the specificity of assets, according to the theory of transaction costs. In the model there were mapped together, the processes of contracting ex ante and ex post, modeling the probability of the quality loss in relation to the price, at the determined common information. The built model in conjunction with the empirical data showed factors generating the negative selection.
Diploma typeDoctor of Philosophy
Author Adam Majgier
Adam Majgier,,
-
Title in EnglishThe negative selection in public service contracts
Languagepl polski
Certifying UnitFaculty of Economic Sciences (ES)
Disciplineekonomia / nauki ekonomiczne(nauki ekonomiczne) / nauki społeczne()
Defense Date22-11-2013
End date19-12-2013
Supervisor Bożena Klimczak (ES / DMaIE)
Bożena Klimczak,,
- Department of Microeconomics and Institutional Economics

Keywords in Englishthe public procurement, the agreement, the contract, the asymmetry of the information, the negative selection
Abstract in EnglishOne of two methods of the offers estimation, submitted by the contractors applying for the public procurement , is the price criterion. In that case, all offers should meet the requirements of the customer who chooses the offer with the lowest price. The specificity of services causes the situation where the buyer cannot verify the quality of the service before it will be consumed. Therefore the ordering can choose the offer which will appear as the low-quality service. The reason of that issue is the asymmetry of the information between the ordering and the contractor which differentiates the private information that have the two sides of the contract at their disposal. The purpose of the work was constructing the model which would let to present the reasons of the inappropriateness of the choices based exclusively on the price. Thereby, the research embraced the conduct in the mode of the unlimited public tender on property protection service, which the subject was the detailed analysis of the common information for all participants of the public tender. The public tender documentation was characterized in terms of completeness of the information and the specificity of assets, according to the theory of transaction costs. In the model there were mapped together, the processes of contracting ex ante and ex post, modeling the probability of the quality loss in relation to the price, at the determined common information. The built model in conjunction with the empirical data showed factors generating the negative selection.
KBN classificationekonomia
Thesis file
Adam Majgier_Negatywna selekcja w zamówieniach publicznych na usługi.pdf 2,06 MB

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